

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

March 13, 2026

The Honorable Christopher Fox
Intelligence Community
Office of Inspector General
Investigations Division, Reston 3
Washington, D.C. 20511

The Honorable Joseph V. Cuffari
Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General
245 Murray Lane SW
Washington, D.C. 20528

Dear Inspectors General Fox and Cuffari,

We write with deep concern regarding the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) investigation into whether cybersecurity staff provided false information to the former Acting Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). We understand that Dr. Madhu Gottumukkala directed a newly created provisional investigatory unit to investigate this incident rather than referring it to the Inspectors General for an independent audit.¹ We respectfully request that the Office of the Intelligence Community (IC) Inspector General and Office of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector General conduct a thorough and independent investigation to determine whether established Intelligence Community and Security Executive Agent directives were followed.

According to public reporting, in July 2025, Dr. Gottumukkala requested access to a Controlled Access Program (CAP) to review information about sensitive intelligence programs, which require officials to have a need-to-know and pass a counter-intelligence scope polygraph (CSP).² As the Acting Director of CISA, Dr. Gottumukkala had a bona fide need to access the CAP for which taking a CSP is required. Subsequently, Dr. Gottumukkala failed two CSPs required for another agency to provide CAP information to CISA.³ In the event of failing a CSP, CISA's Chief Security Officer is required to alert the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and engage a review of the individual's clearance.⁴ However, it is unclear whether such actions were conducted.

On August 1, at least five career staff members and one contractor at CISA who were involved in scheduling and approval of the polygraph examinations received a letter from Michael Boyajian, then Acting Chief Security Officer of DHS, informing them that their security clearances had been suspended.⁵ The letter included an accusation that career staff misled and provided false

¹ John Sakellariadis, "Acting CISA Director Failed a Polygraph. Career Staff Are Now Under Investigation," Politico, December 21, 2025, www.politico.com/news/2025/12/21/cisa-acting-director-madhu-gottumukkala-polygraph-investigation-00701996.

² Intelligence Community Directive 906: Controlled Access Programs, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, accessed via PDF, www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD-906-Controlled-Access-Programs.pdf.

³ John Sakellariadis, "Acting CISA Director Failed a Polygraph. Career Staff Are Now Under Investigation," Politico, December 21, 2025, www.politico.com/news/2025/12/21/cisa-acting-director-madhu-gottumukkala-polygraph-investigation-00701996.

⁴ Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 704.6: Conduct of Polygraph Examinations for Personnel Security Vetting, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), accessed via PDF, www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICPG/ICPG-704-6.pdf.

⁵ John Sakellariadis, "Acting CISA Director Failed a Polygraph. Career Staff Are Now Under Investigation," Politico, December 21, 2025, www.politico.com/news/2025/12/21/cisa-acting-director-madhu-gottumukkala-polygraph-investigation-00701996.

information regarding the requirement for a polygraph examination before accessing CAPs to Dr. Gottumukkala.⁶ On August 4, the suspended staff received a letter from CISA's then Acting Chief Human Capital Officer, stating that they had been placed on administrative leave due to the pending investigation.⁷ As of February 2026, those employees' clearances remain suspended and they remain on administrative leave.⁸

We are concerned that Dr. Gottumukkala failed to adhere to established Intelligence Community and Security Executive Agent directives after failing a CSP.⁹ Moreover, we are alarmed that the then Acting Director of CISA is falsely accusing career CISA staff of providing incorrect information on the requirements to review sensitive information, given the fact that Dr. Gottumukkala requested access to the CAP. This incident raises serious questions regarding the adherence to established Intelligence Community and Security Executive Agent directives, specifically due to the Director of National Intelligence's (DNI) authorities to establish CAPs, provide oversight and accountability, and maintaining an effective program that is consistent with the interests of national security.¹⁰ We seek clarification on if Dr. Gottumukkala obstructed the risk mitigation process associated with polygraph failures, while attempting to gain access to a CAP. The long-term suspensions of key CISA leadership also raise questions regarding whether CISA's Chief Security Officer function is sufficiently staffed.

Due to the IC OIG's role in ensuring that the programs and activities under the DNI's control are executed in an efficient and effective manner and the DHS OIG's role in ensuring security standards are adhered to at DHS, we respectfully request that your offices conduct a full and impartial investigation into this incident and provide answers to the following questions.

1. To what extent were Dr. Gottumukkala's actions consistent with intelligence community directives, DHS policies, or Security Executive Agent directives?
2. What is the exact number of CISA personnel that have been placed on administrative leave because of this incident?
3. What is DHS's justification for having a provisional investigatory unit investigate this incident, rather than referral to the Office of Inspectors General at DHS or the Intelligence Community? Were all protocols followed?
4. Did CISA's Chief Security Officer alert, or attempt to alert, ODNI? Did ODNI engage a review of Dr. Gottumukkala's clearance?
5. Do Dr. Gottumukkala's actions to obstruct or retaliate against DHS employees for disclosing his two counter-intelligence polygraph failures to the Director of National

⁶ Information provided to staff.

⁷ *Id.*

⁸ *Id.*

⁹ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center. (2020, September 1). Security Executive Agent Directive 2 (Revised): Use of polygraph in support of personnel security determinations for initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position. www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/Regulations/Security-Executive-Agent-Directive-2-20201005.pdf

¹⁰ Intelligence Community Directive 906: Controlled Access Programs, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, accessed via PDF, www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD-906-Controlled-Access-Programs.pdf.

Intelligence constitute a Prohibited Personnel Practice under 50 U.S. Code § 3234 or any other policies at DHS?

Thank you for your attention to this urgent matter.

Sincerely,



James R. Walkinshaw
Member of Congress



Shontel M. Brown
Member of Congress



Suhas Subramanyam
Member of Congress



Eleanor Holmes Norton
Member of Congress



Eric Swalwell
Member of Congress